Gödel's incompleteness results show that if ZF is consistent, it is impossible to construct within ZF itself a single object (set) that represents a complete and precise semantic model of ZF. Nevertheless, it has also become clear since then that many kinds of partial models can be constructed within ZF that reveal interesting characteristics of ZF and related formal systems. We develop here one particular class of partial models of ZF, which rely on an extreme form of impredicative reasoning that nevertheless follow the accepted rules of set theory and first-order logic and are constructible within exactly the same variant of ZF as the one being modelled. Some study of these partial models yields interesting results.
Introduction
With his famous incompletness theorems [5, 9] , Gödel showed that for any classical formal system with a certain minimal level of reasoning power, if the system is consistent, then it is necessarily unable to prove either the truth or the negation of every logical statement-and in particular it is unable to prove its own consistency. The axioms of ZF, initially developed by Zermelo to address the antimonies discovered early in the study of set theory [10] , indeed do not appear to provide any way to construct a single set "large enough" to form a model of ZF itself in its entirety, and hence to prove its own consistency. It is relatively easy to model and thus prove the consistency of basic arithmetic within ZF, or to prove the consistency of a limited version of ZF without the Axiom of Replacement within the full system of ZF including the Axiom of Replacement. The axiomatic limitations imposed by Zermelo in order to avoid Russell's Paradox and related antimonies also seem effective in preventing any particular subsystem of ZF from modelling itself precisely enough to prove its own consistency, which would make it fall into "Gödel's Paradox."
Two other aspects of ZF have also concerned some mathematicians and logicians since its initial development, however: first, its ability to express impredicative constructions, or objects defined in terms of a supposedly "existing" collection of objects that actually includes the new object being defined; and second, the Axiom of Choice. The independence results of Gödel [6, 7] and Cohen [1, 2] largely resolved the latter controversy, but the former issue has never been truly resolved. Poincaré was one of the first to object vocally to the use of impredicative reasoning in early set theory [8, 3] ). While most working mathematicians now consider impredicative reasoning to be perfectly legitimate and take it for granted, many philosophers, linguists, logicians, and perhaps even a few mathematicians remain skeptical. No one, at any rate, has come up with a bulletproof argument for or against impredicative reasoning, let alone any kind of proof that it definitely does or does not get us into trouble. The consensus of working mathematicians appears to be that impredicative reasoning is a problem if and only if it causes inconsistency, and since Gödel effectively closed the book on the idea of proving ZF consistent within ZF, the prospect of proving anything of interest about impredicative reasoning in this context seems unpromising.
In this paper we nevertheless study some of the implications of impredicative reasoning, by using it in a particularly aggressive fashion to construct a class of partial models of ZF within ZF itself. By a "partial model" we mean an object of ZF, specifically a set having the properties of a relation, that associates semantic information about a portion of the sets in the ZF universe with a portion of the possible phrases in the language of ZF (suitably encoded). It will become clear that these partial models exhibit a number of interesting properties.
Constructing Impredicative Interpretations of ZF
In constructing a particular partial model of ZF, or interpretation, we will assume that two "parameters" have been chosen at the outset: first, a particular set U representing a "universe" of ZF sets for which this particular model will contain information; and second, a natural number n representing the maximum length of the phrases (formulas and terms) in the language of ZF for which this model will provide information. Thus, an interpretation for U and n embodies semantic information about, and associations between, only sets within U and phrases of length n or less. Most of the definitions and theorems throughout this paper assume that a particular such U and n have been chosen, but the theorems are proven for all possible U and n. In other words, when formalized in the language of ZF itself, these theorems simply have U and n as free variables at the top level. Because there is no limitation on the size of sets that can be plugged in for U , the class of models we develop in this way obviously forms a proper class and not a set.
Once we have chosen a particular U and n, these choices form an upper bound on the amount of information that will be included in a particular interpretation. There is nothing in ZF, however, that requires us to use only information about sets within U in constructing this interpretation for U and n. ZF's Axiom Scheme of Separation (also known as "restricted comprehension") allows us to use an arbitrary first-order logical formula to separate out all the members of an existing set that satisfy that formula, forming those members into a new set. This formula can in particular contain universal and existential quantifiers, each of which range over all possible sets including the set being constructed. The fact that the quantifiers used in a definition can range over the very set being defined is the essence of impredicative reasoning as criticized by Poincaré, and its use is crucial to our construction.
Given a particular U and n, we can form using standard methods the collection of all possible interpretations for U and n, which is easily shown to be a set. From this set of interpretations we then separate out the subset of correct interpretations, which we define to be those that satisfy most of the basic logical and set-theoretic properties that can be deduced purely from the use of sets within U . In a correct interpretation, for example, a formula of the form ¬f of length n or less is associated with the boolean value "true" if and only if the formula f is associated with the boolean value "false." Similarly, if f is a predicate, or a formula with a free variable v, and there is some "witness" set s within U that makes f true when s is used for v, then the correctness of the interpretation guarantees that the corresponding existential quantifier formula ∃vf must be true if ∃vf is of length n or less. There are many possible correct interpretations for a given U and n, however. The absence of a witness set within U for a particular predicate f says nothing about whether such a witness might be found in a larger universe, so in this case the existential formula ∃vf might be true in one correct interpretation for U and n but false in another.
A set of truth assignments that forms a correct interpretation in one universe U does not necessarily form a part of any correct interpretation for a larger universe U ′ . Larger universes have more sets from which to derive semantic information, which means that an interpretation for U ′ and n must satisfy tighter semantic constraints than an interpretation for U and n in order to be correct. Given the set of all possible correct interpretations for our original U and n, however, we can separate out a further subset consisting of all robust interpretations for U and n: those interpretations that are not only correct for U and n, but for which a corresponding correct interpretation also exists having a compatible set of truth assignments for every larger universe U ′ . Finally, from this set of robust interpretations for U and n we can identify a unique minimal robust interpretation: one in which an existential formula of the form ∃vf is associated with the value "true" if and only if there is a witness set in a corresponding robust interpretation for some universe that satisfies the predicate f . While it is not immediately obvious that such a minimal interpretation exists, we prove by ordinary mathematical induction on n that a unique minimal interpretation indeed exists for every U and n. We ultimately find that the interpretations constructed in this way provide surprisingly powerful reflective reasoning capabilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally define ZF − , the variant of ZF we will use here, in which the limited Separation axiom scheme is present but the stronger axioms of Foundation, Replacement, and Choice are left out. In Section 3 we briefly outline the development of the standard mathematical tools we will need, in order to assure ourselves that all of the techniques we will use are still available in this weaker variant of ZF. The reader may want to skip this section on first reading. Section 4 contains the core material of this paper, in which we formally construct the partial models informally outlined above. Section 5 develops some of the key properties of these partial models and explores their implications, and Section 6 concludes.
Formal Definition of ZF

−
In this section we first precisely define the formal system of first-order logic and axiomatic ZF set theory that we will use throughout the paper. Although ZF can be formalized in terms of simpler languages than the one defined here, we find it convenient to use a language with two distinct kinds of syntactic phrases: formulas, representing truth values, and terms, representing sets. While enriching the formal language in this way, we will pare down the actual axiomatization of ZF from standard systems, retaining the basic set-construction axioms and the restricted axiom scheme of Separation, but leaving out Foundation, Replacement, and Choice. Our system is thus at the outset somewhat weaker than full ZF; we will call our system ZF − . In this section, as we formally define ZF − , we will presume for now to be reasoning within, or using as our "meta-mathematical system," any system that obeys the well-understood, "common-sense" laws of mathematics. In later sections we will treat ZF − more specifically as a collection of mathematical objects that we can formally define within ZF − itself using standard Gödel-encoding techniques. In this definition we will gloss over many technical details of syntax that are standard and consistent with well-understood practices for formal languages.
Alphabet
Definition 2.1. The primitive alphabet of ZF − consists of a countably infinite set V of variables, plus the following distinguished symbols: The following phrases are formulas: The following phrases are terms:
Phrases
Theorem 2.5. Any phrase p is not both a formula and a term.
Proof. By induction on the structure of phrases.
Formulas and terms form two disjoint sets with a mutually-inductive syntactic structure: a formula of the form [t 1 ∈ t 2 ] contains the two terms t 1 and t 2 , while a term of the form {v ∈ t|f } contains the formula f in addition to the variable v and term t. We define formulas and terms starting from the "single-inductive" syntactic structure of phrases in order to emphasize that the mutual induction between formulas and terms does not cause difficulties, and more importantly so that we can refer to both formulas and terms generically as "phrases" while ensuring that they are always distinguishable.
The formula "constant" F represents the truth value false, ¬f represents the negation of f , ∃vf means "there exists a v such that f ," [f 1 ∧ f 2 ] represents logical conjunction, and [t 1 ∈ t 2 ] represents the setmembership property.
The term "constants" ∅ and I represent the empty set and some infinite set, respectively. The term t represents the union of all members of the set represented by t, Pt represents the powerset of t, {t 1 , t 2 } is the unordered pair consisting of t 1 and t 2 , and {v ∈ t|f } represents set comprehension, "the set of all members v of t such that f is true of v." In the example formula
Variables and Substitution
, the first occurrence of v is free while the remaining two are bound. In the term {v ∈ v | [∅ ∈ v]}, the first occurrence of v is bound, the second occurrence is free, and the third occurrence is bound. 
Syntactic definitions
The above syntactic structure reflects all of the concepts that we will consider to be "primitive" in ZF − . We can now define the rest of the core concepts of set theory as "syntactic sugar," or non-primitive formulas and terms that merely act as shorthands for larger formulas and terms conforming to the syntax above. 
Set equality
Proper subset relationship 
We consider the forms above to be axiom schemes, each of which represents the countably infinite collection of axioms that can be formed by replacing the letters x, y, and z with any three distinct variable symbols in the primitive alphabet of ZF − , and in the case of Separation, any formula f meeting the specified constraint. For example, if v 1 and v 2 are two distinct variable symbols, then the formulas [v 1 ∈ ∅] and [v 2 ∈ ∅] are two distinct axioms resulting from the first axiom scheme.
We omit the frequently included Axiom of Extensionality from the above list, because our earlier definition of the equality operator '=' as "syntactic sugar" for a formula using only set-membership operators is equivalent to the axiom of extensionality. We also leave out the well-known axioms of Foundation, Replacement, and Choice, because we will not need them here and their omission makes our result stronger. If there were reason to do so, it would not be difficult to extend the proofs in this paper to work in the presence of the axioms of Foundation or Choice, though handling Replacement could present some additional challenges.
Logical Inferences, Inference Rules, and Proofs
Definition 2.12. An inference is a formula of the form
, which we will write in the abbreviated form f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ⊢ f . The formulas f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n constitute a list of zero or more Substitution:
(S) (no free variable in t occurs bound in Σ or f )
Conjunction:
Implication: An inference with no premises has the form [T → f ], abbreviated ⊢ f . We will use the Greek letters Σ and ∆ to represent an arbitrary, possibly empty, finite-length list of premises in an inference. The notation 'f, Σ' represents a single formula f concatenated with a list of formulas Σ, and 'Σ, f, ∆' represents a list of formulas Σ, followed by a single formula f , followed by another list of formulas ∆.
Definition 2.13. A proof in ZF
− is a finite list of inferences The proof structure and inference rules for ZF − form a standard natural-deduction system for first-order logic. The inference rule S for consistently substituting a term for a free variable thoughout an inference, and the rules H1, H2, and H3 for manipulating hypotheses, are often elsewhere treated as implicit structural properties rather than explicit inference rules. H1 allows premises to be reordered arbitrarily, H2 allows an inference to be weakened by adding an additional premise, and H3 (also known as contraction) allows a premise to be used more than once. 
Basic Development of ZF −
This section briefly develops the basic aspects of set theory that we will use in this proof. The purpose of this section is purely to convince ourselves thoroughly that all of the mathematical techniques we will use later are available in ZF − , and do not depend on the standard axioms of Foundation, Replacement, or Choice. Everything in this section can be found in a textbook on set theory [4] , and may be skipped on first reading.
Natural Numbers
Recall that from Definition 2.10, for any set x, the successor of x, abbreviated Sx, is the set x ∪ {x}. Definition 3.1. We define the natural number 0 to be the empty set ∅, the natural number 1 to be S∅, the natural number 2 to be SS∅, and so on.
Clearly for each specific natural number we wish to talk about, we can form a corresponding set of ZF − in this way. Forming the set of all natural numbers, however, takes a bit more work.
Definition 3.2.
A set X is closed over the natural numbers, abbreviated C(X), if the empty set ∅ is a member of X, and for every element x in X, Sx is also in X.
The property C(X) can be formally expressed as a formula in ZF − as follows:
The Axiom of Infinity assures us of the existence of some set I that is closed over the natural numbers. The axioms do not state, however, that the set I contains only those sets that we wish to call "natural numbers": I could conceivably be some larger set. To form the set N consisting of the natural numbers and only the natural numbers, we start with the set I, and use the Axiom of Separation to form the subset of I consisting of those members x that are members of every set X that is closed over the natural numbers: in effect, the intersection of all sets that are closed over the natural numbers. The set N of natural numbers can be defined formally as a term in the language of ZF − as follows:
In this definition we already see impredicative reasoning playing a fundamental role in the formulation of axiomatic set theory: the quantifier ∀X in the formula we use to separate out the desired members of I ranges over all sets-including the very set N being defined-and not just over the members of existing sets that have already been defined and proven to exist. This particular instance of impredicative reasoning is inessential, since we could have started with a stronger axiom of infinity that simply gives us the set N at the outset along with the necessary guarantee that N is the least set closed over the natural numbers. Nevertheless, the development of the natural numbers in the above impredicative fashion is standard and well-accepted in axiomatic set theory.
Mathematical Induction
We now prove the standard scheme for mathematical induction over the natural numbers, which we use extensively throughout the remainder of this paper.
Proof. Uniqueness follows directly from the definition of Sn ≡ n ∪ {n}. To prove existence, suppose n ′ ∈ N , n ′ = 0, and n ′ has no predecessor n ∈ N such that n ′ = Sn. Then we can construct a new set N ′ containing all members of N except for n, and prove that N ′ is also closed over the natural numbers. But then N ′ is a proper subset of N that also is closed over the natural numbers, which is impossible because N is already the intersection of all such closed sets.
Definition 3.4. If n 1 and n 2 are natural numbers, then n 1 is less than n 2 , abbreviated n 1 < n 2 , if n 1 ∈ n 2 . n 1 is less than or equal to n 2 , abbreviated n 1 ≤ n 2 , if n 1 < n 2 or n 1 = n 2 .
It follows by definition that for any n, 0 ≤ n and n < Sn.
Theorem 3.5. Every nonempty subset X of N has a least member x such that for all y ∈ X, x ≤ y.
Proof. Suppose there is a nonempty subset X of N with no least member. Then we can use the Axiom of Separation to form a new set N ′ from N by removing all members of X. N ′ remains closed over the natural numbers because for each element x ′ of X we removed from N , we have also removed its unique predecessor x, guaranteeing that x ′ is not required in the new set to satisfy the closure property. But then N ′ is a proper subset of N that also is closed over the natural numbers, which is impossible because N is already the intersection of all such closed sets. Theorem 3.6. Let P (n) be a ZF − formula with n as a free variable. If P (0) holds, and if for every natural number n ′ P (n ′ ) implies P (Sn ′ ), then P (n) holds for every natural number n.
Proof. Suppose the premises hold but the conclusion does not: thus, there is a natural number n such that P (n) is false. Then using the Axiom of Separation we can form the set X of all natural numbers for which P (n) is false, which is nonempty, and for which there is thus a least member x ′ . But x ′ cannot be 0, since P (0) holds. Therefore, x ′ has a unique predecessor x not in X, and thus P (x) holds but P (x ′ ) does not. But this is impossible because P (x) implies P (Sx).
Given mathematical induction along with the other properties defined so far, the remaining properties of basic arithmetic follow easily, and we will not discuss them further here.
Booleans
It will be useful to be able to "encode" truth values as sets in ZF − that can be manipulated as first-class objects like any other set. To keep the distinction clear between the logical truth of a ZF − formula and truth values as objects, we will refer to the latter as booleans. 
Ordered Tuples, Relations, and Functions
Definition 3.8. The ordered tuple (x, y) is the set {{x}, {x, y}}. The ordered triple (x, y, z) is a shorthand for (x, (y, z)).
Definition 3.9. The Cartesian product X × Y of sets X and Y is the set of all ordered pairs (x, y) such that x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . For ordered triples,
Since any singleton {x} and any unordered pair {x, y} is a member of P[X Y ], the unordered pair {{x}, {x, y}} is likewise a member of PP[X Y ], so by the Axiom of Separation, X × Y forms a set.
Definition 3.10.
A set R is a relation if all members of R are ordered pairs. R is a function if whenever (x, y) and (x, z) are in R, y = z. Definition 3.11. Let R be a function. The update of R mapping x to y, abbreviated R(x → y), is the set of ordered pairs (x ′ , y ′ ) such that if x ′ = x then y ′ = y, and if
is already in R.
Gödel Encoding the ZF − Language Within Itself
Since we will be reasoning about ZF − within ZF − itself, we need a way to encode terms, formulas, and proofs in the language of ZF − into sets that can be treated as first-class objects within ZF − . This encoding presents no special challenge; we must merely be somewhat careful to distinguish a phrase or a proof from its encoding. For this purpose we use the notation p to represent the encoding of a phrase p, or P to represent the encoding of a proof P .
For example, we might associate each of the symbols in the primitive alphabet of ZF − from Definition 2.1 with a unique natural number, such that the numbers 0 through 13 represent the distinguished symbols F , ∅, and so on, and numbers 14 and higher represent variables. If p is a ZF − phrase consisting of l primitive symbols, then we take p to be a function mapping the natural numbers from 0 through l − 1 to the natural numbers representing the corresponding symbols. Finally, if P is a ZF − proof consisting of i inferences f 0 through f i−1 , then we take P to be a function mapping the natural numbers from 0 through i − 1 to the encodings of the corresponding inferences.
Constructing Impredicative Models of ZF
− Within ZF − This section develops the primary result of this paper, a class of semantic models of ZF − that, through aggressive use of impredicative reasoning, can be constructed within ZF − itself. All of the objects we construct and talk about here will be sets and structures built from sets using standard techniques. We will occasionally use the term "class" to refer to a certain property that some sets have while others don't, but in keeping with the constraints of ZF and similar first-order set theories we will never speak of a class as an actual "object" or "individual" that can be substituted for a variable or quantified over. Since we have chosen to omit the axioms of Foundation, Replacement, and Choice from ZF − , we must carefully avoid traditional reasoning practices that follow from them, such as the principle that no set can contain itself as a member or that every set has a choice function. We will use proof by induction extensively, but only ordinary mathematical induction over the natural numbers: transfinite induction is off-limits since we cannot rely on being able to well-order arbitrary sets and develop ordinal or cardinal arithmetic.
Universes
In the exposition that follows, we will use the term universe to refer to an arbitrary set that we use as a starting point from which to build a partial model, or interpretation, of ZF − within ZF − . Any set whatsoever can serve as a universe, including the empty set; we use the term "universe" instead of just "set" merely in order to highlight the difference in how we use particular sets. We will use the letter U and its variants to refer to sets we are using as universes.
Since universes correspond to sets and not classes, we do not expect to find any particular universe "big enough" or containing "enough sets" to model all of ZF − at once. For a particular need involving a definite collection of existing sets, however, it will turn out that we can always construct a set "big enough" to serve as a universe fulfilling that particular need.
More specifically, the structures and proofs we construct later will generally be parameterized by a variable U , universally quantified at the top level, which is taken to denote any specific universe. The theorems we prove in this way will thus be valid for any particular universe. Some theorems will be quantified over multiple set variables denoting multiple universes, such as U 1 and U 2 , in order to prove relationships between structures constructed in similar fashion but for different universes. Since there is no restriction on the "size" a universe may have, we can always construct a new universe "larger than" any particular existing universe. Just like "the collection of all sets," "the collection of all universes" is clearly a proper class and not a set (or universe). This characteristic is incidental, however, because we will never formally talk about "the collection of all universes" but only about particular universes.
Environments
In order to assign a meaningful semantic interpretation to a formula or set-expression containing free variables, we must have a way to assign semantic values to those variables. As is standard practice in model theory and semantics, we use environments, sometimes known as an assignments, for this purpose. Proof. Since E(v) is in U 1 for every v, and every set in U 1 is in U 2 , E(v) is also in U 2 for every v.
Interpretations
Definition 4.3. Let U be a universe and let n be a natural number. A set R is an interpretation for (U, n) if all members of R are ordered triples (E, p , x) such that E is an environment for U , p is a phrase of length n or less, and either:
• p is a formula and x is a boolean, or
• p is a term and x is a member of U .
A set R is an interpretation if it is an interpretation for some particular (U, n).
We use the notation (E, p , x) instead of just (E, p, x) to empahsize the fact that the tuple's second element is actually the encoding of a phrase p of ZF − . Given an environment E that associates each variable with a corresponding set in U , an interpretation relation associates boolean values (0 or 1) with formulas and sets in U to terms. A given interpretation doesn't necessarily associate a value with every language phrase for a given environment. We will construct useful interpretation relations incrementally in the sections below.
Definition 4.4.
A set x is a value for universe U if x is either a member of U or a boolean.
We use the term "value" to describe generically an object that can appear as the third component of a tuple in an interpretation, independent of whether the tuple's second component is a formula or a term. Definition 4.5. Let R be any interpretation. The restriction of R to (U, n) is the set of tuples (E, p , x) in R such that E is an environment for U , p is a phrase of length n or less, and x is a value for U . Theorem 4.6. The restriction of an interpretation R to (U, n) is an interpretation for (U, n).
Proof. Trivial from the definition. The restriction of R to (U, n) simply "throws away" any tuples R contains involving sets outside of U or phrases longer than n symbols, resulting in an interpretation for (U, n).
Definition 4.7. An interpretation R is complete for (U, n) if for every environment E for U and every formula f of length n or less, either
An interpretation is complete for (U, n) essentially if it "decides" in some sense all formulas of length n or less as applied to sets within U . A complete interpretation could actually contain both the tuples (E, f , 0) and (E, f , 1) for a single E and f , however, in which case the information it contains about E and f can hardly be considered as constituting much of a useful "decision."
An interpretation R does not need to be an interpretation for (U, n) specifically in order to be complete for (U, n): R might actually be an interpretation for some other (U ′ , n ′ ) such that U ′ is a superset of U and n ′ ≥ n. When we say that R is complete for (U, n), we are merely stating a property of those tuples in R having to do with formulas of length n or less interpreted with respect to sets within U and environments for U ; we make no statement about tuples R may contain outside of this limit.
If R also happens to be complete for (U, n), then the "function" R is defined (yields a unique value) for every combination of environment for U and formula of length n or less. Even if R is complete for (U, n), however, R is not necessarily defined for every combination of environment for U and term of length n or less, since completeness by definition only has to do with formulas and not terms.
Correct Interpretations
A correct interpretation for a given U and n is an interpretation that associates formulas of length n or less with truth values, and associates terms of length n or less with sets chosen from U , in some fashion that can be determined to "semantically legitimate" based purely on information that can be derived from sets within U . Not all information about sets within a given universe can be derived using only sets within this universe, so there may be many correct interpretations for a given U and n. Nevertheless, correct interpretations reflect most of the basic logical and set-theoretic laws in this limited fashion. Definition 4.9. An interpretation R is formula-correct for (U, n) if the following rules hold for all tuples (E, f , b), where E is an environment for U and f is a formula of length n or less:
Existence: If f is of the form ∃vf ′ , and there is a set s in
U such that (E(v → s), f ′ , 1) is in R, then (E, f , 1) is in R.
Membership: If f is of the form
The rules above for false, negation, and conjunction are "precise": for a given set of truth assignments to the shorter component formulas, the rules only allow one posible boolean to be assigned to the longer composite formula in question. The rules for existence and membership, however, are "conservative": they place constraints on the possible truth assignment in some situations but leave the assignment unconstrained in others. If there is a specific set within the universe U that "witnesses" the satisfiability of a formula f ′ in a given environment, then the rules require ∃vf ′ to be interpreted as true in that environment. If there is no such set, however, the rules leave the existential formula unconstrained, since there may (or may not) be such a witness in some larger universe. Similarly, if the interpretation assigns definite sets to the terms t 1 and t 2 in a membership formula [t 1 ∈ t 2 ], then the truth value assigned by the interpretation must correspond to the semantic membership relationship between those sets. If the interpretation assigns no set to one or both terms, however, then the truth value of the membership formula is unconstrained. 
Union: If t is of the form
Unlike the rules for formula-correctness, the rules for set-correctness above are "precise" in that as long as the interpretation is consistent, there is only one possible set that can be assigned to each term in a given environment if any such set can be assigned at all. If the empty set is not a member of the universe U , for example, then the rules above require that no tuple (E, ∅ , s) exist in R for any E or s. Similarly, suppose an environment E associates with a variable v a set within U whose powerset is not within U . Then the rules above require that no tuple (E, Pv , s) exist in R for any s in that environment. In short, the assignments of sets to terms in a correct interpretation represents precise but generally incomplete information.
Definition 4.11. A set R is correct for (U, n) if R is an interpretation for (U, n), and R is complete, consistent, formula-correct, and set-correct for (U, n).
Correctness in general is merely an aggregation of various properties above. If R is correct for (U, n), then it contains no information about any sets outside of U or phrases longer than n because R is required to be an interpretation for (U, n) specifically. In addition, all the information R contains about sets within U and phrases of length n or less must satisfy the properties of completeness (for formulas), consistency (for both formulas and terms), formula-correctness, and set-correctness.
We have not yet actually proven the existence of any correct interpretations, and we will not until later in Section 4.7.
Theorem 4.12. Let U 1 and U 2 be universes such that U 1 ⊆ U 2 and let n 1 ≤ n 2 . If an interpretation R 2 is correct for (U 2 , n 2 ), then the restriction of R 2 to (U 1 , n 1 ) is correct for (U 1 , n 1 ).
Proof. Let R 1 be the restriction of R 2 to (U 1 , n 1 ). By Theorem 4.6, R 1 is an interpretation for (U 1 , n 1 ) because it eliminates all tuples involving sets outside of U 1 or phrases longer than n 1 . Since R 2 was already complete, consistent, formula-correct, and set-correct for (U 2 , n 2 ), it is clear from the corresponding definitions that as a special case the tuples remaining in R 1 form a complete, consistent, formula-correct, and set-correct interpretation for (U 1 , n 1 ), satisfying the requirements of Definition 4.11 for correctness. Theorem 4.13. Let R and R ′ be correct interpretations for (U, n), such that for every environment E for U and formula f ,
Proof. By induction on n. The base case of n = 0 is trivial since there are no phrases of ZF − of length zero and thus any interpretation for (U, 0) or (U ′ , 0) must be empty. For the induction step, we assume the proposition is true for n and prove it for n+ 1. By the premise, for every environment E for U and formula f , (E, f , 1) is in R iff (E, f , 1) is in R ′ . Since R and R ′ are complete and consistent for (U, n) it follows that (E, f , 0) is in R iff (E, f , 0) is in R ′ . Also, by the induction hypothesis, for every environment E for U , term t of length n or less, and set s, (E, t , s) is in R iff (E, t , s) is in R ′ . We therefore only need to prove this property for terms of length n + 1. It is clear from Definition 4.10, however, that any tuple (E, t , s) is present or absent in R or R ′ under precise conditions that depend only on the presence or absence of other tuples in R or R ′ respectively for shorter terms (and formulas, in the case of Comprehension). But R and R ′ are already known to be equivalent with respect to the presence or absence of these tuples, thus completing the inductive proof.
Theorem 4.14. Let U and U ′ be universes such that U ⊆ U ′ , and let R and R ′ be correct interpretations for (U, n) and (U ′ , n), respectively, such that R ⊆ R ′ . Then for every environment E for U , every phrase p of length n or less, and every value
Proof. First, it is easy to see that this proposition holds for formulas. For any tuple (E, f , b) in R, where E is an environment for (the smaller universe) U , by the assumption R ⊆ R ′ the same tuple (E, f , b) must also be in R ′ . Going in the other direction, for any tuple (E, f , b) in R ′ , because R ′ is correct for (U ′ , n) and thus complete and consistent for (U ′ , n), the tuple (E, f , 1 − b) must not be in R ′ . But then (E, f , 1 − b) must not be in R either, and so (E, f , b) is in R.
We now prove by induction on n that the proposition also holds for terms. As above, the base case is trivial. We now assume that the proposition holds for n and prove that it holds for n + 1. Suppose U ⊆ U ′ , R and R ′ are correct for (U, n + 1) and (U ′ , n + 1) respectively, and R ⊆ R ′ . Let R n be the restriction of R to (U, n), and let R ′ n be the restriction of R ′ to (U ′ , n). By Theorem 4.12, R n and R ′ n are correct for (U, n) and (U ′ , n) respectively, which by the induction hypothesis implies that for every environment E for U , term t of length n or less, and set s in U , (E, t , s) is in R n iff (E, t , s) is in R ′ n . But since R n is identical to R and R ′ n to R ′ for phrases of length n or less, (E, t , s) is in R iff (E, t , s) is in R ′ . We therefore only need to consider tuples (E, t , s) such that E is an environment for U , t is of length exactly n + 1, and s is in U . But the rules for set-correctness in Definition 4.10 ensure that the presence or absence of each such tuple in R or R ′ depends entirely and precisely on the presence or absence in R or R ′ respectively of tuples for shorter terms (and formulas in the case of Comprehension), all of which are present in R iff they are present in R ′ .
Robust Interpretations
Theorem 4.12 above ensures that a correct interpretation R ′ for a particular (U ′ , n ′ ) can always be "pared down" to form a correct interpretation for a different (U, n), whenever U is smaller than (a subset of) U ′ and n ≤ n ′ . Given a correct interpretation R for a particular (U, n) and a tuple (E, f , b) in R, however, it is not necessarily the case that in a larger universe U ′ there is a correct interpretation R ′ for (U ′ , n) that also contains (E, f , b). For example, suppose f is an existential formula of the form ∃vf ′ , and b is 0, which is possible if there is no "witness" set s in U for which (E(v → s), f ′ , 1) is in R. But it is possible that in some larger universe U ′ there is such a witness set, implying that the truth assignment (E, f , 0) is illegal in universe U ′ . Similarly, if f is a membership formula [t 1 ∈ t 2 ], then R could assign any truth value to f in environment E if either t 1 or t 2 has no associated set assigned by R in E, but a larger universe in which such sets exist may force f to a specific truth value with respect to that environment. Definition 4.15. An interpretation R is robust for (U, n) if R is correct for (U, n), and if for every universe
The notion of robustness reflects the property that an interpretation is not only correct for a given universe, but its truth assignments remain valid in all larger universes as well. This is the point at which impredicative reasoning begins to take on a crucial role in our derivations: we are defining the property of robustness for a given universe U in terms of a formula containing a quantifier ∀U ′ , where the variable U ′ ranges over all possible universes, i.e., all sets. This reasoning may seem suspicious, and indeed perhaps it should, but nevertheless it follows the rules of classical first-order logic and set theory. Proof. Let R 1 be the restriction of R 2 to (U 1 , n 1 ). By Theorem 4.12, R 1 is correct for (U, n). Now consider any universe U 
Minimal Interpretations
We now define a partial ordering relationship among interpretations and a notion of a "minimal" robust interpretation. The minimality of an interpretation will ultimately turn out to mean that the interpretation is robust, yet no existential quantifier formulas are true in the interpretation other than those required to be true by the existence of a "witness" set in some universe. 
We define the ordering relationship for interpretations such that any differences in the assignments of truth values to shorter formulas take precedence over differences in the assignments of truth values to longer formulas. The least length n at which there are any differences at all is the only length for which these differences matter in determining order. 
, and every (E, f , 1) in R m+1 is also in R ′ m+1 . But then the ordering relationship R n ≤ R ′ n only depends on the tuples in R n and R ′ n for phrases of m + 1 or less, and these tuples are identically present or absent in R n+1 and R ′ n+1 , respectively.
We now define the notion of a minimal [robust] interpretation in the obvious way.
Definition 4.19. An interpretation R is minimal for (U, n) if R is robust for (U, n), and if for every robust interpretation
R ′ for (U, n), R ≤ R ′ .
Theorem 4.20. If there is a minimal interpretation for a given (U, n), then it is unique.
Proof. Let R and R ′ be minimal interpretations for (U, n), and let R (m) and R ′ (m) be the restrictions of R and R ′ to (U, m), respectively, for any m. By the definition of minimality, R ≤ R ′ and R ′ ≤ R. Supposing R = R ′ , then there must be some m ≤ n such that
. By the contrapositive of Theorem 4.13, there must be an environment E for U and a formula f of length exactly m + 1 such that (E, f , 1) is in R (m+1) but not in R ′ (m+1) , or vice versa. In the former case, it cannot be true that R ≤ R ′ , and in the latter case, it cannot be true that R ′ ≤ R. Our assumption of R = R ′ is therefore impossible, so R = R ′ .
Theorem 4.21. Let U 1 and U 2 be universes such that
Proof. Let R 1 be the restriction of R 2 to (U 1 , n). By Theorem 4.16, R 1 is robust for (U 1 , n). Now given any robust interpretation R ′ 1 for (U 1 , n), we must prove that R 1 ≤ R ′ 1 . This is trivially the case if (U 1 , m) , respectively, for any m ≤ n.
, by the contrapositive of Theorem 4.13, there must be some environment E for U 1 and some formula f of length m + 1 such that (E, f , 1) is in R 1(m+1) but not in R ′ 1(m+1) , and thus in R 1 but not in R (U 1 , n) , so R 1 is minimal for (U 1 , n).
Theorem 4.22. Let U 1 and U 2 be universes such that U 1 ⊆ U 2 , and let R 1 and R 2 be minimal interpretations for (U 1 , n) and (U 2 , n), respectively. Then
Theorem 4.23. Let U 1 and U 2 be universes such that U 1 ⊆ U 2 , and let R 1 and R 2 be minimal interpretations for (U 1 , n) and (U 2 , n), respectively. Then for every environment E for U 1 , every phrase p of length n or less, and every value
Proof. This proposition is simply a combination of Theorems 4.22 and 4.14.
Constructing Minimal Interpretations
We now describe a process for constructing a minimal interpretation for any (U, n) by induction over n, the maximum phrase length to which the interpretation applies.
Definition 4.24. The formula-oracle for (U, n) is the set of tuples (E, f , 1) such that E is an environment for U , f is a formula of length exactly n + 1, and there is a universe U ′ and a minimal interpretation R ′ for (U ′ , n) such that U ⊆ U ′ and the following properties hold:
•
• Existence: If f is of the form ∃vf ′ , then there is a set s in
• Membership: If f is of the form [e 1 ∈ e 2 ], then there are sets s 1 and s 2 in U ′ such that (E, e 1 , s 1 ) and (E, e 2 , s 2 ) are in R ′ , and
The formula-oracle for a particular universe and phrase length is so named because in order to decide whether a given (E, f , 1) tuple should be present, it effectively scans "upwards" through all larger universes U ′ for any minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n) that requires the tuple in question to be present. This kind of reasoning is obviously highly impredicative, and may seem even more suspicious than our definition of robustness earlier since we are actually using it to "construct" sets rather than merely to define a propertybut once again this form of reasoning is perfectly within the rules of first-order logic and ZF.
To construct the set defined above formally, we first construct the set X consisting of all possible environments for U , which a subset of the set P[N × U ]. We then construct the set Y of all possible tuples (E, p , x) in an interpretations for (U, n), which is a subset of the set X × P × V , where P is the set of all phrases in the language of ZF − , and V is the set U ∪ {0, 1} of all possible values for U . From the set Y we finally use the Axiom of Separation to form the set of triples that satisfy the property described above, defined by a formula involving an existential quantifer ∃U ′ that ranges over all possible universes (sets).
Definition 4.25. The formula-extension for (U, n) is the set of tuples (E, f , b) such that E is an environment for U , f is a formula of length exactly n + 1, and:
is in the formula-oracle for (U, n).
• If b = 0, then (E, f , 1) is not in the formula-oracle for (U, n).
The formula-extension merely assigns the boolean value 0 to all environment/formula combinations for (U, n) that the formula-oracle did not force to 1. Thus, for example, if there is no universe U ′ and minimal interpretation R ′ for (U ′ , n) such that (E(v → s), f ′ , 1) is in R ′ , which would force (E, ∃vf ′ , 1) into the formula-oracle for (U, n), then the formula-extension for (U, n) includes (E, ∃vf ′ , 0). Similarly, (E, [e 1 ∈ e 2 ] , 0) is in the formula-extension for (U, n) exactly when there is no universe U ′ and minimal interpretation R ′ for (U ′ , n) in which R ′ associates e 1 and e 2 with some sets s 1 and s 2 in U and s 1 is a member of s 2 .
Definition 4.26. The set-extension for (U, n) is the set of tuples (E, e , s) such that E is an environment for U , e is a term of length exactly n + 1, s is a member of U , and there is a minimal interpretation R for (U, n) such that the following properties hold:
• Empty Set: If e is the symbol ∅, then s is the empty set.
• Infinite Set: If e is the symbol I, then s is the set of all natural numbers.
• Set Variable: If e is a variable v, then s = E(v).
• Union: If e is of the form e ′ , then there is a set s ′ such that (E, e ′ , s ′ ) is in R, and s is the union of all members of s ′ .
• Powerset: If e is of the form Pe ′ , then there is a set s ′ such that (E, e ′ , s ′ ) is in R, and s is the powerset of s ′ .
• Unordered Pair: If e is of the form {e 1 , e 2 }, then there are sets s 1 and s 2 such that (E, e 1 , s 1 ) and (E, e 2 , s 2 ) are in R, and s is the unordered pair consisting of the elements s 1 and s 2 .
• Comprehension: If e is of the form {v ∈ e|f }, then there is a set s ′ such that (E, e , s ′ ) is in R, s ⊆ s ′ , and for every member
The set-extension for (U, n) merely inserts exactly those tuples for terms of length n + 1 required to make the resulting interpretation set-correct for (U, n + 1). No "inter-universe magic" is required here as it is for formula-extension.
We still have not yet proven that any minimal interpretations exist, and the definitions above do not assume that they do. Supposing that no minimal interpretation exists for a particular (U, n), for example, the set-extension for (U, n) would be empty.
Definition 4.27. The extension for (U, n) is the union of:
• All members of the minimal interpretation for (U, n), if one exists,
• The formula-extension for (U, n), and
• The set-extension for (U, n).
Lemma 4.28. For every universe U , the empty set is a minimal interpretation for (U, 0).
Proof. It is easy to see from the definitions of completeness, consistency, correctness, and robustness that the empty set trivially meets all of these requirements for (U, 0). Further, since an interpretation R for (U, n) can only contain tuples (E, p , x) for phrases p of length n or less, and there are no phrases of length zero, the empty set is the only possible interpretation for (U, 0). The empty interpretation is therefore the only robust interpretation for (U, 0), and hence is minimal for (U, 0).
Lemma 4.29. If for every universe U
′ there is a minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n), then for every universe U the extension for (U, n) is correct for (U, n + 1).
Proof. Let R n be the minimal interpretation for (U, n) whose existence is guaranteed by the premise, and let R n+1 be the extension for (U, n + 1) as defined above. We first prove the preconditions that R n+1 is complete and consistent for (U, n + 1), then prove that it is correct for (U, n + 1).
Completeness: Since R n+1 includes every member of R n and R n is already complete for (U, n), so is R n+1 . Furthermore, Definition 4.25 above ensures that for each environment E for U and formula f of length n + 1, we include either (E, f , 1) or (E, f , 0) in R n+1 , ensuring that R n+1 is complete for (U, n + 1).
Consistency: As for completeness, the induction hypothesis ensures that R n+1 is consistent for (U, n), and Definition 4.25 ensures that R n+1 is consistent for (U, n + 1).
Correctness: As above, R n is already formula-correct and set-correct for (U, n), and in forming R n+1 we do not add or remove any tuples for phrases of length n or less, so R n+1 remains formula-correct and set-correct for (U, n). Comparison of Definitions 4.9 and 4.24 shows that R n+1 is formula-correct simply by taking U ′ to be U in Definition 4.24. Similarly, Definition 4.26 ensures that R n+1 is set-correct for (U, n + 1) according to Definition 4.10.
Lemma 4.30. If for every universe U
′ there is a minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n), then for every universe U the extension for (U, n) is robust for (U, n + 1).
Proof. Let R n be the minimal interpretation for (U, n), and let R n+1 be the extension for (U, n). Suppose U ′ is any universe such that U ⊆ U ′ . Let R ′ n be the minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n) that our induction hypothesis guarantees exists, and let R ′ n+1 be the extension for (U ′ , n). By Lemma 4.29 above, R n+1 and R ′ n+1 are correct for (U, n + 1) and (U ′ , n + 1) respectively, and by Theorem 4.22, R n ⊆ R ′ n . We need to show that R n+1 ⊆ R ′ n+1 in order to satisfy the requirements for robustness in Definition 4.15. Consider any tuple (E, p , x) in R n+1 . If |p| ≤ n, then by Theorem 4.14, (E, p , x) is in R ′ n+1 . If p is a formula f of length n + 1, then by Definition 4.25, (E, f , 0) is in R n+1 iff (E, f , 1) is not in R n+1 , and similarly for R ′ n+1 , so we only need to consider the case when x = 1. By Definition 4.24, if (E, f , 1) is in R n+1 , there must be a universe U o such that U ⊆ U o and a minimal interpretation R o for (U o , n) such that one of the following is the case:
• Negation: f is of the form ¬f ′ , and (E, f ′ , 1) is not in R o . Then there is also a universe U Given our tuple (E, p , x) in R n+1 , suppose that p is not a formula but a term e of length n + 1. Then by Definition 4.26 there must be a minimal interpretation for (U, n) such that the bulleted properties listed in the definition hold, and since minimal interpretations are unique, those properties must hold of R n . Since R n ⊆ R ′ n , by Theorem 4.14 the tuples in R n that the new term tuples in R n+1 depend on are identical to the corresponding tuples in R ′ n that the new term tuples in R ′ n+1 depend on, and hence those new tuples are identical in the respective extensions.
Thus, we have shown that for any universe U ′ such that U ⊆ U ′ , the extension R ′ n+1 for (U ′ , n) includes R n+1 as a subset, proving the original hypothesis that R n+1 is a robust interpretation for (U, n + 1).
Lemma 4.31. If for every universe U
′ there is a minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n), then for every universe U the extension for (U, n) is minimal for (U, n + 1).
Proof. Let R n be the minimal interpretation for (U, n), and let R n+1 be the extension for (U, n), which by the above lemma is robust for (U, n + 1). Suppose that R ′ n+1 is any interpretation that is robust for (U, n + 1). From Definition 4.19, we must show that R n+1 ≤ R ′ n+1 according to the ordering relationship for interpretations in Definition 4.17.
By the definitions of extension in this section, R n is clearly equal to the restriction of R n+1 to (U, n). Let R ′ n likewise be the restriction of R ′ n+1 to (U, n), which by Theorem 4.16 is robust for (U, n).
But this is the case since R n is minimal for (U, n). We now therefore only need to handle the remaining case in which R n = R ′ n . Consider any tuple (E, f , 1) in R n+1 such that f is a formula of length n + 1. We must show that (E, f , 1) is also in R • If f has the form ¬f ′ , then (E, f ′ , 1) is not in R o , and thus from Theorem 4.14, (E,
• If f has the form [f 1 ∧ f 2 ], similar reasoning applies.
• If f has the form ∃vf ′ , then there is a set s in , and hence R n+1 is minimal for (U, n + 1).
Theorem 4.32. There is a unique minimal interpretation for every (U, n).
Proof. By induction on n using the above lemmas.
Properties of Minimal Interpretations and their Implications
Now that we have proven the existence of a unique minimal interpretation for every (U, n) combination, in this section we develop and explore the properties of these interpretations.
Semantic Truth and Set Representation
It should be already apparent that a minimal interpretation carries considerable semantic information about the relationship between sets and the (encoded) terms and formulas of ZF − . We can in fact use minimal interpretations to define a direct semantic truth relationship between formula/environment combinations and boolean truth values, and to define a direct set representation relationship between term/environment combinations and ZF − sets.
Definition 5.1. Let E be an environment for some universe U , and let f be a formula of length n. The formula f is true in E if (E, f , 1) is in the minimal interpretation for (U, n).
Definition 5.2. Let E be an environment for some universe U , let t be a term of length n, and let s be any set. The term t represents s in E if there is a universe U ′ such that U ⊆ U ′ and (E, t , s) is in the minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n).
We now prove the key theorem that each (encoded) ZF − term semantically represents a unique set.
Theorem 5.3. For any environment E for universe U , and any term t of length n, there is a unique set s such that t represents s in E.
Proof. We first prove the uniqueness of the set s. Suppose there are two sets s 1 and s 2 such that t represents both s 1 and s 2 in E. Then by definition there are universes U 1 and U 2 such that U ⊆ U 1 and U ⊆ U 2 , (E, t , s 1 ) is in the minimal interpretation R 1 for (U 1 , n), and (E, t , s 2 ) is in the minimal interpretation R 2 for (U 2 , n). Let U ′ be the union of U 1 and U 2 . Then by Theorem 4.23, (E, t , s 1 ) and (E, t , s 2 ) are both in the minimal interpretation R ′ for (U ′ , n). But because R ′ is consistent for (U ′ , n), s 1 = s 2 . We now prove the existence of the set s by induction on the term length n. We assume that proposition holds for all terms of length n or less, and prove it for terms of length n + 1. Consider the structure of t:
• Empty Set: If t is the symbol ∅, then let U ′ be the union of U with the singleton set containing the empty set (U ′ = U ∪ {{}}), and let R be the unique minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n + 1). Since R is set-correct for (U ′ , n + 1), Definition 4.10 requires (E, t , {}) to be in R.
• Infinite Set: The same reasoning applies.
• Set Variable: If t is a variable v, we just take U ′ to be U itself, and the set s to be E(v), which must be in U because E is an environment for U .
• Union: If t is the symbol t ′ , by the induction hypothesis there must be a unique set s ′ such that t ′ represents s ′ in E. Let s be the union of all members of s ′ , and let U ′ be the union of U with the singleton set containing only the set s. Then (E, t , s) is in the minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n + 1).
• Powerset, Unordered Pair, Comprehension: Similar reasoning applies.
We have thus proven both the existence and the uniqueness of s for every term t and environment E.
Theorem 5.4. Let E be an environment for some universe U . Each of the following semantic properties hold of every formula f :
• False: If f is the symbol F , then f is not true in any E.
• Negation: If f has the form ¬f ′ , then f is true in E iff f ′ is not true in E.
• Conjunction: If f has the form [f 1 ∧ f 2 ], then f is true in E iff both f 1 and f 2 are true in E.
• Existence: A formula of the form ∃vf is true in E iff there is a set s such that f is true in the environment E(v → s).
• Proof. Let n be the length of f . The properties for False, Negation, and Conjunction formulas follow directly from Definition 4.9 and the fact that the unique minimal interpretation for (U, n) is formula-correct for (U, n). The existence and membership properties follow from Definition 4.24 and the fact that by Lemma 4.31, the unique minimal interpretation for (U, n) is equal to the extension for (U, n).
Theorem 5.5. Let E be an environment for some universe U . All of the following semantic properties hold of every term t:
• Empty Set: If t is the symbol ∅, then t represents the empty set in any E.
• Infinite Set: If t is the symbol I, then t represents the set of all natural numbers in any E.
• Set Variable: If t is a variable v, then t represents E(v) in E.
• Union: If t has the form t ′ , then t represents s in E iff t ′ represents s ′ in E and s is the union of all members of s ′ .
• Proof. Let n is the length of f , and let U ′ be a superset of U large enough that the minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n) contains all the required tuples associating terms with the relevant sets in the rules above. The existence of a large enough universe U ′ is guaranteed in each case by Theorem 5.3. Each of the above properties then follows directly from Definition 4.10 and the fact that the unique minimal interpretation for (U ′ , n) is set-correct for (U ′ , n).
The following theorem is easy to derive from the above properties and will be useful for reasoning about variable substitution in formulas and terms: Theorem 5.6. Let v and v ′ be distinct variables, let p be a phrase in which v ′ does not occur, let E be an environment for universe U , and let s be a set in U . Then:
• If p is a term t that represents set
Proof. By induction on the length of phrases p.
Syntactic Consistency of ZF
−
If the above reasoning is not greviously in error, we now have the tools required to form an "absolute" proof of the consistency of ZF − , within ZF − itself. Recall Definition 2.15 of the syntactic theory of ZF − . We define the corresponding semantic theory of ZF − as follows.
Definition 5.7. The semantic theory of ZF − is the set of formulas f such that for every universe U and every environment E for U , f is true in E.
It follows trivially that the semantic theory is consistent. Proof. From Theorem 5.4 above, in any universe U and environment E for U , ¬f is true in E iff f is not true in E. If ¬f is true in every E, therefore, f cannot be true in any E, and vice versa.
We can now prove using a straightforward inductive argument that every syntactically provable theorem of ZF − is also a member of the semantic theory of ZF − , implying that the syntactic theory is also consistent. Recall from Definition 2.12 that an inference of the form Σ ⊢ f is just a syntactic shorthand for the formula Proof. By induction on i. We assume that inferences Σ j ⊢ f j in the proof P are formulas in the semantic theory for 0 ≤ j < i, and show that this is also the case for inference Σ i ⊢ f i . According to the rules of Definition 2.13, one of the following must be true of inference Σ i ⊢ f i :
• f i is one of the premises in Σ i .
• f i is one of the axioms of ZF − from Definition 2.11.
• Σ i ⊢ f i results from applying one of the inference rules in Table 1 to earlier inferences in the proof.
For the first case, suppose that for every universe U and every environment E for U , f i is true in E. Then from the properties in Theorem 5.4, any formula of the form [f ′ → f i ] is also true in every E, and the inference Σ i ⊢ f i is a formula having exactly this form. If on the contrary there is some E such that f i is not true in E, then in that environment E the formula [
representing the premises Σ i of the inference is not true in E, ensuring that the inference itself remains true in every E. Now consider the axioms of ZF − . To prove that an inference Σ i ⊢ f i is true in every environment E for some universe U , it is clearly sufficient to prove that f i alone is unconditionally true in every such E. , this formula is true in environment E(y → s y ) for every set s y iff whenever s y is a member of E(x), s y is also a member of E(z). Thus, the quantified formula ∀y[[y ∈ x] → [y ∈ z]] is true in E iff E(x) is a subset of E(z), exactly matching the conditions under which the earlier subformula [x ∈ Pz] is true in E, thus making the axiom as a whole true in every E. The reasoning for the other axioms follows directly along the same lines.
Finally, suppose the new inference Σ i ⊢ f i is the result of applying one of the inference rules from Table 1 to earlier inferences in the proof. We can assume for each rule that the antecedents above the horizontal line represent inferences that are semantically true in every environment E, and must prove that the consequent is also semantically true in every E. Doing so is tedious but straightforward for most of the rules; we only work through the rules for existential quantifiers here since these are perhaps the least obvious.
For the existential introduction rule (∃I), we can assume that the inference Σ ⊢ f [v ′ /v] is true in every environment E and that v ′ does not occur in f , and must prove that Σ ⊢ ∃vf is true in E. Suppose that the formula represented by the premise list Σ is true in E. Then f [v ′ /v] must also be true in E, and by Theorem 5.6, f must be true in environment E(v → s), where s = E(v ′ ). But then the existential formula ∃vf is true in E, making the inference Σ ⊢ ∃vf true in E. If Σ is not true in E, however, then the conclusion is trivially satisfied, proving that the inference rule (∃I) holds.
For the existential elimination rule (∃E), we can assume that the inferences Σ ⊢ ∃vf 1 and f 1 , Σ ⊢ f 2 are true in every E, and must prove that Σ ⊢ f 2 is true in every E. If Σ is not true in a given environment E, then the conclusion is trivially satisfied, so assume that Σ is true in E. Then by the first antecedent, ∃vf 1 must be true in E, so there must be a universe U ′ and a set s in U such that E(v → s) is an environment for U and f 1 is true in E(v → s). Since v does not occur free in Σ and Σ is true in E, Σ is also true in E(v → s). Since the second antecedent f 1 , Σ ⊢ f 2 is true in every environment including E(v → s), f 2 must be true in E(v → s). Since v does not occur free in f 2 either, f 2 must likewise be true in E, and the conclusion of the inference rule is satisfied. Proof. Suppose a formula f existed such that both f and ¬f are theorems of ZF − , and hence there are proofs ending with the inferences ⊢ f and ⊢ ¬f . Then by Theorem 5.9 above, both f and ¬f must also be in the semantic theory of ZF − , but this is impossible because in Theorem 5.8 we proved the semantic theory to be consistent.
Conclusion
The above consistency result would have been most welcome had it not been for the likes of Gödel. As it stands, if the reasoning in this paper holds up to scrutiny, then it follows immediately from Gödel's incompleteness theorems that ZF − is inconsistent-as are all stronger systems including full-power ZF. I will leave it at that for now and leave any further exposition, conjectures, or concluding remarks until the core result has been either validated or found to be in error.
